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Intergroup conflict represents one of  the most 
pressing social problems of  our time. The 
newspapers are filled with accounts of  inter-
group conflicts that greatly affect the people 
involved. The most constructive way of  dealing 
with such conflict is through negotiation, which 
can be defined as a discussion between two or 
more parties aimed at resolving a perceived 
divergence of  interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 
1993). Intergroup negotiations are typically 
conducted by representatives (Adams, 1976; 
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Walton & McKersie, 1965)—negotiators who 
represent the interests of  a group. One key fac-
tor that distinguishes intergroup negotiation 
from interpersonal negotiation is the fact that 
representatives in intergroup negotiation 
defend not just their own interests but also the 
interests of  their constituent groups. Indeed, in 
a sense, the ‘eyes of  the group are on them’.
This position of  representing a group means 
that representatives’ behavior in intergroup nego-
tiation may be influenced not only by their own 
dispositions and motivations, but also by intra-
group dynamics. Little is known about how rep-
resentatives navigate this complicated situation. 
In the present study we address this issue, devel-
oping an analysis of  how group norms relevant 
to negotiation (i.e., putting a premium on a coop-
erative vs. a competitive stance) may shape repre-
sentatives’ negotiation behavior depending on 
their own position within the group (i.e., whether 
they are central or peripheral to the group) and 
their dispositional need to belong (i.e., whether 
they have a stable desire to belong with others 
and to be included in groups).
Representative’s standing within the 
group: the role of  prototypicality
Standing within the group is an important pre-
dictor of  behavior in intergroup conflict. 
Particularly, group members vary in the extent 
to which they are prototypical of  the group, 
that is, representative of  what group members 
have in common and what differentiates the 
group from other groups. Some group mem-
bers possess characteristics that are more pro-
totypical of  the group, and therefore can be 
considered more representative exemplars of  
the group than others (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Group members 
who strongly match group prototypes can be 
referred to as prototypical members. Individuals 
who are less prototypical examples of  their 
group can be referred to as peripheral members. 
Among other things, differences in centrality 
have been shown to affect perceived identity 
security (e.g., Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997), 
intergroup discrimination (Noel, Wann, & 
Branscombe, 1995), aggressive outgroup 
behavior (Short & Strodtbeck, 1974), and self-
esteem (e.g., Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 
2002; Moreland, 1985).
Because being part of  certain groups is a 
crucial basis of  one’s self-concept (see Hogg, 
2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1985; 
Turner et al., 1987), peripheral group members 
are often motivated to secure their group mem-
bership (e.g., Noel et al., 1995), especially when 
group membership is attractive (Van Kleef, 
Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 
2007). Group members that are not central to 
the group therefore appear to be highly respon-
sive to the social context (Jetten et al., 2002). 
One possible consequence of  this motivation 
that is particularly relevant in the context of  
intergroup conflict concerns contentious behav-
ior toward the outgroup. Compared to group 
members with a central, secure position in their 
group, individuals with a marginal, insecure sta-
tus in a desirable group are more likely to engage 
in outgroup derogation (Noel et al., 1995) and to 
approach outgroups in a competitive way 
(Hermann & Kogan, 1968; Van Kleef  et al., 
2007; Wall, 1975).
Although it is tempting to interpret these find-
ings as evidence that peripheral group members 
are more prone to engage in competitive behavior 
toward outgroups than are prototypical group 
members, this conclusion would be premature. 
Prior research has often focused on the behavior 
of  group representatives in the presence of  com-
petitive goals. That is, representatives were either 
explicitly instructed to further the interests of  their 
own group (e.g., Vidmar, 1971); had good reason 
to assume that competition was the norm, for 
example, when competing was the only way to 
secure favorable outcomes for the group (e.g., 
Benton & Druckman, 1974; Klimoski, 1972), or 
when competitive incentives were more salient 
than cooperative ones (e.g., Steinel, De Dreu, 
Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009). Furthermore, 
without explicit information about constituent 
expectations, peripheral negotiators tend to 
assume that their constituents favor a competitive 
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approach (Holmes & Lamm, 1979; Van Kleef  
et al., 2007).
In the current article, we integrate literature on 
the behavior of  peripheral and prototypical group 
members in intergroup settings, the role of  norms 
as defining characteristics of  one’s ingroup, and 
individual differences in the motivation to main-
tain relationships and propose an alternative 
explanation for the effect of  group member 
prototypicality on competition in intergroup 
negotiation (e.g., Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef  et al., 
2007): Peripheral group members behaved more 
competitively than prototypical group members 
in earlier studies because the desire to be a valued 
part of  the group motivated them to exhibit 
norm-congruent behavior (and competition was 
the implicit norm). Next we review relevant litera-
ture on prototypicality, norms, and need to belong 
to derive specific predictions about the interactive 
effects of  these variables on behavior in inter-
group negotiation.
Prototypicality and behavior in 
intergroup settings
Several studies suggest that peripherals are highly 
sensitive to contextual cues that inform effective 
strategies aimed at improving their status in the 
group. For instance, Noel et al. (1995) found that 
peripherals displayed high levels of  ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup derogation only when 
doing so could improve their position within the 
group (i.e., under public conditions). Likewise, 
Van Kleef  et al. (2007) found that, compared to 
prototypicals, peripherals negotiated more com-
petitively with an outgroup when they were held 
accountable for their behavior and when group 
membership was attractive, but not when they 
were not accountable or group membership was 
less attractive. Similarly, Jetten, Branscombe, 
Spears, and McKimmie (2003) found that low-
identifying peripheral group members were less 
loyal when they anticipated rejection by the 
group than when they anticipated acceptance. 
This finding suggests that peripherals’ tendency 
to behave in a group-serving way depends on 
their identification with the group and on their 
expectation that serving the group can provide 
them with a desirable outcome, such as accep-
tance by the group.
These studies thus suggest that peripherals 
adapt their behavior in order to enhance their 
position within their group, depending on their 
desire to be accepted by their group. In doing so, 
they are especially sensitive to contextual infor-
mation that determines the effectiveness of  their 
behavior in terms of  securing group membership. 
Besides exhibiting ingroup favoritism and/or out-
group derogation (see Noel et al., 1995), an addi-
tional way in which peripheral group members 
may improve their position within the group is by 
stressing characteristics that they share with the 
ingroup prototype (Schmitt & Branscombe, 
2001). The more group members embody the 
core values of  the group, the more prototypical 
they are of  that group. Thus, publicly endorsing 
group norms should be an effective way for 
peripheral group members to enhance their posi-
tion within the group. Preliminary support for 
this idea comes from a study by Jetten, Hornsey, 
and Adarves-Yorno (2006), who found that 
peripheral group members strategically tailored 
self-reports of  conformity to the social context, 
expressing more conformity when their responses 
were made public to an ingroup audience than 
when they were not. These findings support our 
view that peripherals in earlier studies behaved 
more competitively toward the outgroup than 
prototypicals because of  their motivation to 
endorse group norms, and group norms implicitly 
or explicitly prescribe competition in many situa-
tions of  intergroup conflict (Benton & Druckman, 
1974; Druckman, 1994; Van Kleef  et al., 2007).
Prototypicality and norm-congruent 
behavior
Norms are social regularities that are bounded 
by group memberships and describe behavior 
that defines group membership (Turner, 1991). 
From a social identity perspective, group norms 
are viewed as reflecting what defines the group 
(Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner et al., 
1987; Van Knippenberg, 2000). Because the 
782  Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(6) 
norms that a group embodies are an important 
characteristic of  the group, people can demon-
strate their group membership by adhering to 
the group’s norms. The research discussed 
above (e.g., Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef  et al., 
2007) is consistent with the idea that people can 
assert their group membership through group-
normative behavior: Defending the interests of  
one’s own group by trying to achieve good 
outcomes and by derogating the outgroup may 
be seen as group-normative behavior in many 
conflict situations (Druckman, 1994; Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 1993; Van Kleef  et al., 2007).
Under some circumstances, however, groups 
may not appreciate competitive behavior of  their 
representatives. For instance, in negotiations 
between groups who share a history of  coopera-
tion (like stores specializing in a brand article and 
the manufacturer of  this brand), competitive 
behavior may be inappropriate. When a group val-
ues cooperation, outgroup competition is likely to 
be less appreciated. Indeed, several studies showed 
that representatives became relatively cooperative 
and lenient in their negotiation behavior when 
they believed that their constituency favored a 
cooperative approach towards the outgroup 
(Enzle, Harvey, & Wright, 1992; Gelfand & Realo, 
1999; Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Steinel et al., 2009).
If  a group favors cooperation rather than 
competition, the motivation to assert member-
ship by adhering to group norms should produce 
cooperative rather than competitive behavior. 
Therefore, rather than engaging in blind competi-
tion or outgroup derogation, peripheral group 
members should engage in behaviors that they 
think are valued by the group. If  the group values 
competition, they should compete, but if  the 
group values cooperation, they should cooperate 
in order to make a favorable impression on their 
fellow group members and enhance their posi-
tion within the group.
This is not to say that prototypical group 
representatives would not be sensitive to group 
norms. On the contrary, being prototypical of  a 
group leads to self-definition in terms of  the 
group membership (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 
1997) and thus to internalization of  group norms 
(Turner et al., 1987). Therefore, prototypical 
representatives’ negotiation behavior, too, is 
likely to be shaped by group norms. Importantly, 
however, in contrast to prototypical representa-
tives’ norm-congruent negotiation behavior, the 
extent to which peripheral members’ negotiation 
behavior is norm-congruent is likely to be more 
variable. Only to the extent that peripheral 
members are motivated to be accepted by the 
group will they be motivated to engage in norm-
congruent behavior as a means to assert their 
group belongingness.
The role of  need to belong
Capturing this moderating influence of  the 
motivation to be accepted on the link between 
group norm and negotiation behavior allows us 
to further develop and extend our understanding 
of  the motivational differences underlying the 
negotiation behavior of  prototypical and periph-
eral group members. To do so, we rely on research 
by Baumeister and Leary (1995) that suggests that 
there are stable individual differences in the ‘need 
to belong’. According to these authors, the ‘desire 
for interpersonal attachments—the need to 
belong—is a fundamental human motivation’ 
(p. 520). The need to belong makes people strive 
to build and maintain relationships with others. 
A strong need to belong can motivate people to 
exhibit group-serving behaviors. For example, 
De Cremer and Leonardelli (2003) showed that 
people with a high dispositional need to belong 
focused more on the collective interest of  the 
group in large-group social dilemmas.
Extending these insights to the issue of  proto-
typicality and norm-congruent behavior, we pro-
pose that dispositional differences in the need to 
belong shape peripheral group members’ motiva-
tion to be accepted by the group, and thereby 
their adherence to group norms and concomitant 
negotiation behavior. That is, a peripheral posi-
tion within the group may engender a motivation 
to assert group belongingness, but we propose it 
does so more strongly the stronger peripheral 
group members’ need to belong. As a conse-
quence, peripheral representatives’ negotiation 
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behavior will also be informed by group norms 
to the extent that they have a high need to belong. 
That is, we propose that whereas prototypical 
representatives’ negotiation behavior is group 
norm-congruent irrespective of  their need to 
belong—their group belongingness is assured by 
their prototypical position—peripheral represen-
tatives’ negotiation behavior is more norm-
congruent the higher their dispositional need 
to belong.
Present study and hypotheses
Summarizing this analysis, our model is depicted 
in Figure 1. It posits that prototypicality predicts 
the motivation to be accepted by the group 
depending on the dispositional need to belong. 
Specifically, compared to prototypical members 
(who are already central to the group), peripheral 
members should have a stronger motivation to be 
accepted by their group to the degree that their 
dispositional need to belong is higher (Hypothesis 1). 
The representatives’ motivation to be accepted by 
the group in turn predicts norm-congruent nego-
tiation behavior. Specifically, to the extent that 
representatives have a stronger motivation to be 
accepted by the group, they should be more likely 
to behave in accordance with the group norm, 
behaving cooperatively when the group norm 
prescribes cooperation and competitively when it 
prescribes competition (Hypothesis 2).
In conjunction, these arguments lead to the 
prediction that the extent to which peripheral 
representatives behave in accordance with com-
petitive or cooperative group norms is contingent 
on their need to belong, whereas prototypical 
representatives endorse the norm regardless of  
their need to belong. Thus, we hypothesize that 
the higher peripheral negotiators’ need to belong, 
the more cooperatively they behave toward the 
outgroup representative when a cooperative 
norm is in place, and the more competitively they 
behave when a competitive norm is in place, 
whereas prototypical negotiators show coopera-
tion or competition according to the group norm 
irrespective of  their need to belong (Hypothesis 3).
Method
We used an adapted version of  an established 
experimental set-up in which all participants 
were assigned to the role of  group representa-
tive in an intergroup negotiation (cf. Van Kleef  
et al., 2007). Prototypicality was manipulated 
through bogus feedback on a personality test 
that supposedly divided the participants into 
two groups. Group norm was manipulated 
through instructions that groups composed of  
individuals with this specific personality charac-
teristic value either cooperation or competition. 
To avoid confusing the status of  being periph-
eral with being in a minority, we used two differ-
ent group compositions: groups that consisted 
of  one peripheral and three prototypical mem-
bers and groups that consisted of  two peripheral 
and two prototypical members. This counterbal-
ancing factor had no effect and will therefore 
not be discussed further.
Participants and experimental design
A total of  107 undergraduate students (38 
males and 69 females, average age M = 23.10 
years, SD = 5.72) at the University of  
Queensland participated in the study and 
received course credit. The design included 
group norm (cooperative vs. competitive) and 
participants’ prototypicality (prototypical vs. 
Prototypicality
Need to belong
Group norm Competitiveness
Motivation to
be accepted
Figure 1. Theoretical model.
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peripheral) as between-participants variables, 
and competitiveness of  demands as the central 
dependent variable. Furthermore, dispositional 
need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) was 
measured at the onset of  the experiment using a 
validated scale developed by Leary, Kelly, 
Cottrell, and Schreindorfer (2001) and added as 
a continuous variable to the design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to conditions, and the 
experimenter was blind to this assignment.
Procedure and manipulations of  independent 
variables
The procedure was similar to that used by Van 
Kleef  et al. (2007). About six to eight partici-
pants came to the laboratory in each session. 
They were instructed that they would be working 
in groups in two parts of  the experiment. First 
they would use the computer to complete tasks 
and communicate with their fellow group mem-
bers, and next they would join their group to 
work together. Participants were seated in sepa-
rate cubicles, and were introduced to the com-
puterized part of  the experiment. All following 
instructions were presented on the screen.
Participants read that they would be divided 
into two groups on the basis of  their personality 
in order to investigate the effect of  personality 
on group decision-making. Subsequently, partici-
pants completed a so-called ‘personality ques-
tionnaire’, which was used to manipulate 
prototypicality (see Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef  
et al., 2007) and group norm. Upon completion 
of  the questionnaire, participants were told that 
their group task would be to design three adver-
tisement posters, which would be awarded a cer-
tain number of  points, and that the groups would 
compete against each other for a reward. 
Participants learned that randomly selected rep-
resentatives of  the two groups would negotiate 
the reward system, determining how many points 
each group would get for each poster, and that it 
was important to obtain as many points as pos-
sible, as the members of  the group that obtained 
most points would win a lunch voucher. 
Participants were then assigned the role of  group 
representative, and engaged in negotiations with 
a (computer-simulated) representative of  the 
outgroup.
Manipulation of  prototypicality We used a 
manipulation of  prototypicality that has been 
successfully employed before (De Cremer, 2002; 
Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef  et al., 2007), pro-
viding participants with bogus feedback on a 
‘personality questionnaire’. Participants were 
told that the questionnaire assessed the so-
called ‘O-type/P-type personality’. Examples of  
items are ‘I feel uncomfortable when someone’s 
meaning or intention is unclear to me’ and 
‘When trying to solve a problem I often see so 
many possible options that it’s confusing.’ 
Participants read that O-type and P-type per-
sons differ in a number of  respects, such as that 
they tend to think in different ways and come 
up with different solutions to creative problems.
They then learned that their responses on the 
questionnaire would not only reveal whether they 
were an O-type or a P-type person, but also how 
characteristic they were of  their group. The com-
puter would characterize each participant as a 
typical, a moderate, or a peripheral member of  
the respective personality group. Participants 
then saw a graphical representation of  the O/P 
continuum (Figure 2). Their own participant 
number and three numbers ostensibly referring 
to other participants who were also classified as 
P-types were plotted on the graph. This indicated 
how well participants fit into their group. In the 
prototypical [peripheral] group member conditions, 
their number was plotted in the ‘typical P-type’ 
[‘peripheral P-type’] box of  the figure. Furthermore, 
participants in the prototypical [peripheral] group mem-
ber condition received the following information:
Your test score is 63 [43]. As you can see, this 
score places you at the core of [just inside] the type-
P category. You are a typical [peripheral] P-type. 
This means that had you responded somewhat 
differently to one or two of  the questionnaire 
items, you would still [not] have been classified 
as a type-P person. Not only do [Although] you 
have more in common with other type-P 
persons than with type-O persons, you are 
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actually a near perfect example of  a type-P person [not 
very characteristic of  the type-P group]. Because you are 
a typical P-person [Although you are a peripheral 
P-person], it is [still] nicer for you to be in the 
P-group than in the O-group.
This latter sentence was added to make sure that 
peripheral participants, too, would still feel they 
belonged more to the P-group (ingroup) than to 
the O-group (outgroup).
Manipulation of  group norm In the coopera-
tive group norm condition, participants read that 
P-type persons usually try to achieve the best out-
comes for their group by approaching other groups 
in a cooperative, constructive way. In the competi-
tive group norm condition, participants were told 
that P-type persons usually try to achieve the best 
outcomes for their group by focusing on their own 
group’s benefits when dealing with other groups.
Negotiation task The computer ostensibly 
selected the representatives of  the two groups at 
random. All participants were told that they would 
act as representative of  the P-group and that they 
would negotiate with the representative of  the 
O-group via the computer network. We used the 
negotiation task employed by Van Kleef  et al. 
(2007), that was based on tasks developed by Hilty 
and Carnevale (1993) and De Dreu and Van Lange 
(1995; see De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van 
Kleef, 2007). The task captures the main charac-
teristics of  real-life negotiation (i.e., multiple issues 
differing in utility to the negotiator, information 
about one’s own payoffs only, and the typical 
offer–counteroffer sequence). Participants saw a 
payoff  chart showing how many points their 
group could earn with each poster. They were told 
that their objective was to earn as many points as 
possible for their group. For each campaign, nego-
tiators had to agree on one out of  nine possible 
deals. An agreement on level 1 would yield most 
points to the participants; higher levels would 
yield consistently fewer points, and level 9 would 
yield 0 points (see Van Kleef  et al., 2007, for 
details). The corresponding payoff  table for the 
O-group was not displayed, and participants were 
told only that it differed from their own. Some 
seconds later, participants could enter a first 
offer, and were instructed that the negotiation 
would continue until an agreement was reached 
or until time ran out. About 30 seconds later, a 
preprogrammed counteroffer appeared, and it 
was the participant’s turn to enter a counteroffer 
again. The counteroffers in the six rounds were 
8-7-8, 8-7-7, 8-6-7, 7-6-7, 7-6-6 and 6-6-6. 
Following previous research, negotiations were 
interrupted after round six (e.g., De Dreu & Van 
Lange, 1995; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993) to guaran-
tee that a possible agreement could not influence 
any subsequent dependent measures.1
Measures
Need to belong was assessed with the scale by 
Leary et al. (2001). Participants rated ten state-
ments (e.g., ‘It bothers me a great deal when I am 
not included in other people’s plans’, and ‘I have 
a strong need to belong’) on 5-point scales (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The indi-
vidual items were summed so that higher scores 
indicate a higher need to belong.
Figure 2. The O-type/P-type continuum.
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The dependent measures were competitive-
ness of  demands (dependent variable), motiva-
tion to be accepted (mediator), and manipulation 
checks. Participants’ demands (in points accord-
ing to the payoff  schedule) for each poster cam-
paign in each of  the six rounds of  negotiation 
were averaged into an index of  the negotiator’s 
average demands (see De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, 
& Van De Vliert, 1994; Steinel et al., 2008; Van 
Kleef  et al., 2007), with higher scores indicating 
greater competitiveness.
After the negotiation, motivation to be 
accepted was measured with two items: ‘How 
important is it for you that your group accepts 
you?’ and ‘How concerned are you that you 
won’t be accepted by your group members?’ 
(1 = not very important, 9 = very important). 
We used nine statements (1 = strongly disagree, 
9 = strongly agree) to check the group norm 
manipulation. Five statements related to coop-
eration (e.g., ‘The P-group would value their 
representative to be cooperative with other 
groups’) were averaged into a composite score 
of  perceived cooperative norm. Four statements 
related to competition (e.g., ‘To please the 
P-group, their negotiator should make tough 
offers to the other group’) were averaged into a 
composite score of  perceived competitive norm. To 
check our manipulation of  prototypicality, we 
asked participants to indicate their position on 
the O/P-continuum (Figure 2). Participants 
received course credit for participation, were 
debriefed and thanked.
Results
Descriptive statistics, treatment of  the data and 
analyses
Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations 
and intercorrelations of  the dependent variables 
and manipulations. Gender and age had no 
effects (all ps > .25) and were excluded from the 
analyses. We dummy coded prototypicality and 
group norm (0 = peripheral, 1 = prototypical; 0 
= cooperative, 1 = competitive) and centered 
need to belong. Unless otherwise reported, we 
used regression analyses, following the proce-
dures described by Aiken and West (1991). We 
entered the main effects in Step 1 and the two-
way interactions in Step 2. Where applicable, the 
cross-product of  all three variables was used to 
predict the dependent measure in Step 3.
Manipulation checks
All participants answered the manipulation check 
for prototypicality correctly. Regression analysis 
involving perceived cooperative group norm as 
the dependent variable and group norm, proto-
typicality, and need to belong as predictors revealed 
only a main effect of  group norm (B = -0.895, 
SE = 0.227, t[103] = -3.95, p < .001). A follow-
up t test showed that participants perceived 
the norm to be more cooperative in the coopera-
tive condition (M = 6.39, SD = 1.04) than in the 
competitive condition (M = 5.47, SD = 1.27; 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of  the variables 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Motivation to be accepted 5.08 1.83 .73a
2. Need to belong 32.78 6.31 .21* .75a
3. Demand level 572.33 89.41 .01 .16 –
4. Perceived cooperative norm 5.92 1.25 .09 -.05 -.27** .79a
5. Perceived competitive norm 6.40 1.50 .06 .01 .28** -.21* .82a
6.  Typicality – – .03 .17 .11 .15 .09 –
7.  Group norm – – .04 .11 .34*** -.37*** .40*** -.05 –
Note: N = 107. Prototypicality was dummy-coded 0 for peripheral and 1 for prototypical; group norm was dummy-coded 0 
for cooperative and 1 for competitive. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
aCronbach’s alpha. 
Steinel et al. 787
t[105] = 4.08, p < .001). Similar results emerged 
for perceived competitive group norm. Again, 
the only significant predictor in a multiple regres-
sion analysis was group norm (B = 1.242, SE = 
0.269, t[103] = 4.62, p < .001). Participants 
perceived the norm to be more competitive in the 
competitive condition (M = 6.99, SD = 1.26) 
than in the cooperative condition (M = 5.78, 
SD = 1.49; t[105] = -4.53, p < .001). Our manipu-
lation of  group norm was thus successful.
Hypothesis 1: Two-way interaction of  
prototypicality and need to belong on the 
motivation to be accepted
The overall model, regressing the motivation to 
be accepted on prototypicality, need to belong, 
and their interaction, was significant (F[3, 103] 
= 4.15, p = .008; overall R2 = .11). The motiva-
tion to be accepted was predicted by need to 
belong (B = 0.136, SE = 0.039, t[103] = 3.50, 
p = .001) and, in line with Hypothesis 1, by the 
interaction between prototypicality and need to 
belong (B = -0.147, SE = 0.055, t[103] = -2.69, 
p = .008). Simple slope analysis (see Aiken & 
West, 1991) showed that peripheral representa-
tives were more motivated to be accepted by the 
group when they had a high rather than a low 
need to belong (B = 0.136, SE = 0.039, t[103] = 
3.50, p < .001), whereas prototypical representa-
tives’ motivation to be accepted by the group 
was not contingent upon their need to belong 
(B = -0.011, SE = 0.039, t[103] = -.29, ns).
Hypothesis 2: Two-way interaction of  
motivation to be accepted and group norm on 
competitiveness
The overall model, regressing competitiveness on 
motivation to be accepted (centered), group norm, 
and their interaction, was significant (F[3, 103] = 
6.26, p = .001; overall R2 = .15). Competitiveness 
was predicted by the group norm (B = 60.352, SE 
= 16.150, t[103] = 3.74, p < .001) and, in line with 
Hypothesis 2, by the interaction between the 
motivation to be accepted and group norm (B = 
20.461, SE = 9.143, t[103] = 2.24, p = .027). Simple 
slope tests revealed that participants with a high 
motivation to be accepted made more cooperative 
demands when there was a cooperative group 
norm than when there was a competitive group 
norm (B = 97.854, SE = 23.415, t[103] = 4.18, 
p < .001), whereas participants with a low motiva-
tion to be accepted were unaffected by the group 
norm (B = 22.851, SE = 23.130, t[103] = .99, ns).
Hypothesis 3: Three-way interaction of  
prototypicality, need to belong, and group norm 
on competitiveness
The overall model, regressing competitiveness 
on prototypicality, need to belong, group norm, 
and their two- and three-way interactions, was 
significant, F(7, 99) = 4.58, p < .001 (see Table 2 
for regression coefficients of  all effects). As 
predicted under Hypothesis 3, the three-way 
interaction between prototypicality, need to 
belong, and group norm significantly predicted 
competitiveness. We probed the three-way inter-
action using the procedure described by Aiken 
and West (1991). This showed that prototypical 
group members acted according to the group 
norm, making more competitive demands under 
a competitive norm than under a cooperative 
norm (B = 96.178, SE = 22.478, t[99] = 4.28, 
p < .001; see Figure 3a). As anticipated, this effect 
was not moderated by need to belong (B = -1.474, 
SE = 3.571, t[99] = -0.41, ns). By contrast, and 
also in line with predictions, for peripheral group 
members the effect of  group norm was moder-
ated by need to belong (B = 10.492, SE = 3.951, 
t[99] = 2.66, p = .009; see Figure 3b). Simple 
slope analysis revealed that peripherals with a 
high need to belong behaved in accordance with 
the group norm, adopting a more competitive 
stance when the group norm prescribed competi-
tion rather than cooperation, B = 103.452, 
SE = 37.881, t(99) = 2.73, p < .007. Peripherals 
with a low need to belong, however, were not 
significantly influenced by the group norm, B = 
-28.927, SE = 29.282, t(99) = -.99, ns.
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Figure 3a. Competitiveness of  prototypical group 
members as a function of  group norm and need to 
belong.
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Figure 3b. Competitiveness of  peripheral group 
members as a function of  group norm and need to 
belong.
Table 2. Hierarchical regression analyses on competitiveness (Hypothesis 3)
B SE t
Step 1 Main Effects
  Prototypicality 19.710 16.512 1.19
  Need to Belong 1.577 1.321 1.19
  Group Norm 58.670 16.379 3.58**
  Contribution to R2 .14**
Step 2 Two-way Interactions
  Prototypicality -11.297 17.218 -.48
  Need to Belong 0.419 2.650 .16
  Group Norm 27.607 22.955 1.20
  Prototypicality × Need to Belong -2.370 2.622 -.90
  Prototypicality × Group Norm 63.048 32.096 1.93†
  Need to Belong × Group Norm 3.906 2.702 1.45
  Contribution to R2 .07*  
Step 3 Three-way Interaction
  Prototypicality -3.569 23.303 -.15
  Need to Belong -4.251 3.327 -1.28
  Group Norm 37.262 22.911 1.63
  Prototypicality × Need to Belong 5.177 4.230 1.22
  Prototypicality × Group Norm 58.916 32.096 1.84†
  Need to Belong × Group Norm 10.492 3.951 2.66**
   Prototypicality × Need to Belong 
× Group Norm -11.966 5.326 -2.25*
  Contribution to R2 .04*  
  Overall R2 .25**
Notes. N = 107. Prototypicality was dummy-coded 0 for peripheral and 1 for prototypical; group norm was dummy-coded 0 
for cooperative and 1 for competitive. Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors are reported. † p < .10;
* p < .05; ** p < .01.
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Mediation analysis
So far, we have demonstrated that: (1) the inter-
action between prototypicality and need to 
belong predicts the motivation to be accepted 
(Hypothesis 1); (2) the interaction between the 
motivation to be accepted and group norm 
predicts competitiveness (Hypothesis 2); and 
(3) the interaction between prototypicality, group 
norm, and need to belong predicts competitive-
ness (Hypothesis 3). Our theoretical model sug-
gests that the motivation to be accepted is the 
explanatory mechanism behind the effects of  
prototypicality, group norm, and need to belong 
on competitiveness. To explore this, we followed 
the procedure suggested by MacKinnon, Fairchild 
and Fritz (2007; cf. MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 
2002) which tests the strength of  the indirect 
path between the predictor and the criterion. 
This procedure takes into account that we did 
not find nor expect an interaction between 
prototypicality and need to belong on competi-
tiveness (because this effect is qualified by group 
norm), and that we did not find nor expect simple 
mediation by motivation to be accepted (because 
this effect depends on group norm, see Figure 1). 
The first path of  the indirect effect, i.e., the interac-
tion between prototypicality and need to belong 
predicting the motivation to be accepted, was 
significant (B = -0.147, SE = 0.055, t[103] = 
-2.69, p = .008). The second path of  the indirect 
effect, i.e., the interaction between motivation to 
be accepted and group norm predicting competi-
tiveness when all predictors are included in 
the model, was also significant (B = 19.298, SE = 
9.170, t(100) = 2.10, p = .038). A Sobel test indi-
cated that the indirect effect was also significant 
(Z = 1.66, p < .05, one-sided), providing addi-
tional support for our model.
Discussion
Unlike interpersonal negotiations, where nego-
tiation behavior is strongly affected by negotia-
tors’ personal goals and interests, in intergroup 
negotiation representatives must take into 
account the interests of  their group. In such 
representative negotiations, group norms rele-
vant to the negotiation—that is, norms speaking 
to the desirability of  competitive vs. cooperative 
negotiation behavior—become an important 
source of  influence on negotiation behavior, 
inviting norm-congruent negotiation behavior. 
We demonstrated that such norm-congruent 
behavior depends on the representative’s stand-
ing within the group and their dispositional need 
to belong. Specifically, we found that prototypical 
representatives act in accordance with the group’s 
norm, regardless of  their dispositions. Thus, they 
adopt a cooperative stance when the group favors 
cooperation and a competitive stance when the 
group favors competition. Peripheral representa-
tives, in contrast, only adhere to the group norm 
when they have a high dispositional need to 
belong. This need to belong drives their motiva-
tion to be accepted by the group, which in turn 
motivates norm-congruent behavior.
The present study provides an important exten-
sion and qualification of  previous research that 
could not distinguish between norm-congruency 
and competitiveness vis-à-vis the outgroup 
negotiation party. A study by Van Kleef  and 
colleagues (2007) suggested that peripheral rep-
resentatives are more competitive than proto-
typical representatives when they are accountable 
to a desirable group. The present findings paint 
a more nuanced picture: Peripheral representa-
tives are not necessarily more competitive than 
prototypical representatives. Rather, they strate-
gically behave in ways that they think will 
enhance their position within the group, but 
only when they have a high need to belong. In 
that case, they show norm-congruent behavior 
to assert their group belongingness. When the 
group favors competition, this leads to competi-
tive behavior. When the group favors coopera-
tion, however, this leads to cooperative behavior. 
Interestingly, peripheral representatives were 
unaffected by the group norm when they had a 
low need to belong. This indicates that periph-
eral members are highly sensitive to contextual 
factors and exhibit strategic behavior aimed at 
furthering their own position within the group 
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when they are so motivated (see also Jetten et al., 
2003; 2006; Van Kleef  et al., 2007).
The behavior of  prototypical representatives 
appears to be less motivated by self-interest. 
Prototypical representatives in our study behaved 
according to the group norm regardless of  
whether they had a high or low need to belong. 
The need to belong reflects individual differences 
in the desire to relate to others (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). Prototypical members, by defini-
tion, are central members of  their group, and 
hence need to belong does not affect their behav-
ior in that group context, because their need to 
belong is already satisfied. Behaving according to 
the group norm instead can be expected to follow 
from the influence of  their group prototypicality 
on their self-definition which leads them to 
internalize group interests and norms (cf. Spears 
et al., 1997). In a way, then, prototypical represen-
tatives’ behavior is more predictable, because, 
unlike peripherals, they can be expected to defend 
the group’s values irrespective of  their individual 
tendencies.
Theoretical and practical implications
Our findings contribute to research on the need 
to belong. They show that the need to belong is 
especially important for people who occupy a 
peripheral position in their group. This has 
interesting implications for the study of  ostra-
cism and social exclusion (Williams, 2007; 
Williams, Forgas, & Von Hippel, 2005). Social 
exclusion makes people aware of  the fact that 
they do not belong to a group, which should be 
especially problematic for individuals with a 
high need to belong. Our findings indicate that 
people with a low need to belong are less 
affected by their position in the group. This 
implies that they may also suffer less from being 
excluded. Thus, on the positive side, need to 
belong promotes group-serving behavior, but 
on the negative side it may also exacerbate the 
detrimental effects of  social exclusion. Literature 
on social exclusion has focused on belonging-
ness needs as a consequence of  the threat of  exclu-
sion (e.g., Knowles & Gardner, 2008). Even 
though previous research has not found moderating 
effects of  need to belong on people’s ability to 
cope with ostracism (Williams, 2007), our find-
ings suggest that especially people with a high 
dispositional need to belong suffer from the 
threat of  exclusion.
Our findings further suggest that competing 
only helps to assert one’s group membership 
when competition is the norm. When the group 
favors a cooperative approach, however, com-
petition towards an outgroup is no longer a 
means to show one’s belonging to the group. 
Consequently, our findings demonstrate that 
people show their belongingness to the group 
not necessarily by behaving competitively, but 
rather by behaving consistently with the group 
norm. In intergroup negotiation, therefore, 
group norms are a crucial predictor of  repre-
sentative behavior. The only people whose 
behavior is not guided by group norms, accord-
ing to our study, are peripheral members with a 
low need to belong.
On a more practical level, our data speak to 
the question of  who should be sent to represent 
the group in intergroup negotiations. Groups 
may not always send their most prototypical 
member to intergroup negotiations. Instead, a 
peripheral member may represent the group for 
different reasons, for example, because of  task-
relevant expertise (e.g., when purchasing techni-
cal equipment), fluency in a language, availability, 
or negotiation experience (see similar evidence 
that it is not necessarily the most prototypical 
member that leads the group; Hogg & Van 
Knippenberg, 2003). One interpretation of  pre-
vious research is that peripheral group members 
represent their group with a more competitive 
approach toward the outgroup (Van Kleef  et al., 
2007), which at least from some people’s per-
spective may appear to be the ‘better’ stance. The 
current research indicates, however, that proto-
typical group members may be more reliable 
representatives in terms of  acting in accordance 
with group norms. Peripheral group members 
only act in accordance with group-normative 
expectations when they are motivated to enhance 
their position in the group.
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Limitations and avenues for future research
There are some limitations to our findings. First, 
there was no face-to-face interaction. Although 
scenarios and simulations are commonly used in 
intergroup relations research (e.g., Hewstone, 
Rubin, & Willis, 2002), our findings may be 
limited to computer-mediated interaction. Given 
the pervasiveness of  negotiation as a form of  
social interaction and the increasing popularity of  
information technologies as a communication 
medium, the question of  how representatives 
negotiate via computer-mediated communication 
is itself  of  great theoretical and practical impor-
tance (cf. McKersie & Fonstad, 1997). Nevertheless, 
some caution is needed when generalizing the 
results to other settings.
Our findings are also limited by the cultural 
background of  our sample (Australian psychology 
students). Australia is a relatively individualistic 
culture (Hofstede, 2001). In more collectivistic cul-
tures such as Japan, being accepted by one’s group 
is even more important, there is greater emphasis 
on cooperation within the group, and less empha-
sis on cooperation with the outgroup (Triandis, 
2001). This suggests that in collectivistic cultures 
individuals with peripheral status may be even 
more motivated to assert their group membership. 
In combination with a competitive group norm, 
this could lead to competitive intergroup interac-
tions. Future research could explore whether our 
findings also hold in different cultural contexts.
The pre-programmed negotiation task used in 
the present study did not allow for integrative 
win–win agreements. Therefore, competition 
and cooperation can be regarded as two extremes 
of  one scale: Larger concessions are indicative 
of  more cooperative negotiation behavior, and 
smaller concessions reflect more competitive 
negotiation behavior (De Dreu et al., 2007). This 
must have been clear to our participants, as is evi-
dent from the fact that their offers on the three 
issues were highly correlated within each round of  
negotiation (Cronbach’s alpha > .60). In negotia-
tions that do allow mutually beneficial trade-offs 
between negotiators, competition and coopera-
tion may occur at the same time (e.g., holding firm 
on a negotiation issue that is important to oneself, 
while conceding on an issue that is more impor-
tant for the counterpart). Investigating the behav-
ior of  peripheral and prototypical negotiators in 
integrative negotiation settings is therefore an 
interesting avenue for future research.
Another avenue for future research concerns 
the behavior of  the outgroup. In our study, the 
demands of  the outgroup representative were 
standardized to enable clear conclusions regard-
ing the effects of  prototypicality, group norm, 
and need to belong. If  our conclusion that 
peripheral representatives respond more strategi-
cally to contextual information than prototypical 
representatives is correct (see also Jetten et al., 
2003; 2006; Van Kleef  et al., 2007), then they 
might also be more susceptible to changes in the 
outgroup representative’s behavior, especially if  it 
provides opportunities to enhance their own 
position within the group.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that intra-
group influences interact with dispositions to pre-
dict motivation and behavior in intergroup 
conflict, speaking to Pruitt and Carnevale’s (1993, 
p. 153) claim that ‘when groups and organizations 
face each other in negotiation, within-group 
dynamics can have important consequences for 
the between-group negotiation’. By showing that 
a high need to belong in combination with a 
peripheral position in the group increases people’s 
motivation to be accepted and thereby stimulates 
norm-congruent behavior, the present findings 
deepen our understanding of  why and how intra-
group dynamics shape intergroup negotiations.
Note
1. Two participants reached agreement in round 6. 
Removing their data did not change the pattern of  
results.
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